Virtuous Soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?

Matthew Beard

Centre for Faith, Ethics & Society
University of Notre Dame, Australia

Prepared for “War, Peace and the Liberal Arts” Conference
Hosted by The Gaede Institute for the Liberal Arts

Santa Barbara, California
23-25 February, 2013

matthew.beard@nd.edu.au
Virtuous Soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?

“You cannot make men good by law”
- C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity

Introduction

Ethical discussions of war tend to centre around two distinct, but related, areas. The first area involves discussions about what can and cannot - as a matter of principle - be done in the lead up to, execution of and resolution of war. These set of ideas are commonly called just war theory (JWT):¹ the discussion of when and how military force might be used in a way that comports with broader ideas of justice. The second, less popular area discusses the moral lives and character of those participating in war, and examine the various ways in which a person’s character can affect the way that they conduct themselves at war, and vice versa.²


² Recent examples of this approach include the works of Nancy Sherman: Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind, OUP, Oxford, 2005 and The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds and Souls of Our Soldiers, WW Norton, New York, 2010; Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient
Although I say that these two areas are related, their relation is similar to that of estranged brothers: although there is a formal relationship between the two, but the occasions on which the two actually come together are extremely rare; and when they do, there is a good chance that things will get messy.

It is somewhat surprising that this is the case, because a review of the history of JWT reveals that the original architects of the theory viewed an important role for questions of virtue, character, moral psychology and intention within JWT, not just as a thematically related moral question, but as a central aspect of the theory itself. For the fathers of JWT, it did not make a good deal of sense to talk about what could and could not be done justly in war without also discussing the agent performing the just or unjust deed.

Over time, however, attempts to develop JWT into a set of codified principles led to a diminishing interest in the more ambiguous areas of the theory, such as virtue: Hugo Grotius, perhaps the most substantial contributor to the codification project, distinguished between that could be done under the law of nations, viz. that which one could not be punished for doing, and that which it was morally right or virtuous to do.³

When I first set out to explain this part of the law of nations I bore witness that many things are said to be 'lawful' or 'permissible' for the reason that they are done with impunity [...] things which, nevertheless, either deviate from the rule of right [...] or at any rate may be omitted on higher grounds and with greater praise among good men.⁴

Grotius demonstrates his point with reference to Seneca’s Trojan Women, where Phylliuss claims that no law protects captives from any form of injury, to which Agamemnon responds "[w]hat law permits, this sense of shame forbids."⁵ This "sense of shame" is a recognition of what Grotius calls "internal justice": the moral laws that govern warfare, and forbid what the law of nations may permit.⁶

This trend has continued, with JWT increasingly pursuing the path of prescribing (for the most part) what a soldier, officer, general, politician or even civilian should do in any

---

⁶ RWP, Bk. III, XI.II. One example of the moral governance of warfare is the Gospel command to love one’s neighbour. "No one can justly be killed intentionally, except as a just penalty or in case we are able in no other way to protect our life and property; although the killing of a man on account of transitory things, even if it not at variance with justice in a strict sense, nevertheless is not in harmony with the law of love." The law of love to which Grotius refers is best embodied in John 13: 34 (NIV) "A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another."
particular situation. This usually takes a deontological form, describing various duties or principles that must be upheld (the most obvious examples are the jus in bello principles of proportion and discrimination). The lens through which these duties and principles are usually developed and reconciled with one another is human rights, the idea being that a war which the nation has a right to wage, and in which all agents perform only actions they have a right to perform (that is, a war in which nobody is wronged), will be an entirely just war.

To say that this represents a significant change in JWT is uncontroversial, however it is not yet clear how we should view such a change. That an epochal shift in thinking has occurred does not condemn the shift. after all, the Australian Government’s apology to its Indigenous peoples for past indiscretions marked a historical shift from the foundations of the country in racial discrimination against Aboriginals, but none would say that merely on this basis that the apology was bad simply because of the historical deviation. Not all change is good, but similarly, not all change is bad either.

And not all the changes to JWT are bad; they are, however, interesting and, in some ways, problematic. In what follows I will first demonstrate that such a shift occurred, and in doing so outline briefly how and why virtue was seen to be an integral part of some of the original JWTs. In tracing this shift, I will also attempt to describe how these two different approaches to JWT might inform our conception of the other, less-emphasised aspect of military ethics: the virtuous soldier. Following this, I will argue that it is the more dated, classical conception of JWT and of the virtuous soldier that best comports with recent trends within military ethics education (MEE) which are beginning to emphasise the development of the moral character and virtue of their soldiers (especially officers). Finally, whilst supporting these recent trends, I will suggest some ways in which the classic model of liberal arts education might supplement and support this virtue-based approach to MEE.

The Flight from Virtue in JWT

The first part of this section will describe classical JWT, viewed through the works of two of its fathers – St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas – as particularly interested in virtue as a central aspect of JWT. Despite the presence of other significant contributors to classical JWT, I choose these two because they are unquestionably the two most influential figures of the early development of JWT, and also because following Aquinas, JWT begins to move in the modern direction thanks to the contributions of Francisco di Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. It is in Augustine and Aquinas that we see the origins of virtue-based JWT in its most pure form, serving as an excellent comparison to modern-day theories (described in the second section).

A: Classical JWT

---

7 So much was said in the opening line of the introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Military Ethics focusing on Virtue Ethics. See: Rene Moelker & Peter Olsthoorn, ‘Virtue Ethics and Military Ethics’, The Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2007, pp. 257-258 at p. 257. “It has frequently been argued in recent years that the best way to teach military ethics is by way of virtue ethics.”
St. Augustine, often credited as being the father of JWT,\(^8\) presented a theologically centred approach to the justification of war whereby wars were fought primarily on divine authority. However, Augustine also believed that the soul was the seat of virtue, and therefore that what was most significant in moral evaluations were the internal states of agents.

What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like.\(^9\)

Further emphasising the view of internal states is Augustine’s insistence that just wars be fought with a spirit of reluctance and sobriety, without hatred or enmity. “For it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by human beings [...] And yet a man who experiences such evils, or even thinks about them, without heartfelt grief, is assuredly in a far more piti able condition, if he thinks himself happy simply because he has lost all human feeling.”\(^{10}\)

In the thirteenth century the work of St. Augustine was to be revived by another Doctor of the Church; this time, The Angelic Doctor: St. Thomas Aquinas. When Aquinas discusses war, he situates the discussion within in a broader discussion of the virtues, arguing it to be one of the vices against charity. It is a vice insofar as it acts against peace, which is one of three ‘effects’ of charity. However, where war aims to restore a peace that is already broken, it may be just; on the other hand, where war acts against peace, it is unjust.\(^{11}\) Ultimately though, all JWs are acts of charity.\(^{12}\)

---


\(^10\) Augustine, *CG*, 19.7

\(^11\) Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1, Accessed: [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/](http://www.newadvent.org/summa/) 15/1/12 "War is opposed to peace." Also: "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good."

\(^12\) There is ongoing debate regarding whether the inclusion of war in discussions of charity indicates a ‘presumption against war’ whereby the use of force is looked down on more strongly than some readers of Aquinas have suggested. For the affirmative case in this debate, see: Eli S. McCarthy, ‘The Virtue Ethics Difference in the Just War Discourse of James Turner Johnson and Catholic Social Teaching’, *Political Theology*, Vol. 12, Iss. 2, 2011, pp. 275-304; for the counter-argument, see: Ryan R. Gorman, ‘War and the Virtues in Aquinas’ Ethical Thought’, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, 2010, pp. 245-261. I find Gorman’s argument, which sides with James T. Johnson’s, the more compelling and consistent with Thomas’ writings. Manning’s argument for the presumption against war makes claims which are unsustainable, for example, citing Todd Whitmore, Manning argues that Johnson’s rejection of the presumption against war leads to permitting first-use of nuclear weapons, and argument which over-reaches almost to the point of *non sequitur*. 

5
Charity, for Aquinas, is the virtue of love between persons which is based on a love for God. However, charity is not just one of many virtues, but is what Thomas calls a "special virtue", meaning that it is a virtue that relates directly to a particular 'species' of love (Divine love), and therefore no true virtue is possible without charity. This leads Aquinas to call charity "the form of the virtues" because it directs man to his ultimate end, God. Jean Porter argues that justice is derivative of charity, which explains in some way why Aquinas treats JW under charity. First, Porter explains the two precepts of charity: love of God and love of neighbour, and that it serves as the foundation for all normative requirements.

Because all persons are in fact capable of salvation, charity and its obligations should be extended to all. These obligations include all the naturally derived duties of justice, together with duties specific to charity, to adopt special attitudes of joy, peace and mercy towards all.

Peace is one of the 'special attitudes' of charity; Thomas calls it one of the effects of charity. For Aquinas, peace entails two separate things: first, "concord", understood as "the wills of various hearts agree[ing] together in consenting to the same thing"; and second, what modern natural lawyers call "inner peace", which Aquinas explains with reference to the various desires that a person can have simultaneously.

In so far as one and the same appetite power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time.

---

13 ST, II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1, "it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God." and, in Resp. 2, "Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed." For charity as a virtue, see Art. 3
14 ST, II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4
15 ST, II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7. Here Aquinas explains that charity is required for "true virtue" because although each virtue directs man to a particular good, charity directs man to the ultimate end and source of goodness, God.
16 ST, II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8. See n.66 for further explanation.
17 Jean Porter, 'De Ordine Caritatis. Charity, Friendship and Justice in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica', The Thomist, Vol. 53, 1989, pp. 197-214 at 199. "Its most fundamental precept is the first great commandment to love God above all things, and this commandment implies that the individual should refer all his or her actions to God in some way. The command to love the neighbor, considered as the second precept of charity, enjoins us to love each person for the sake of God, as one who is called to fellowship with God along with us, and for whom we wish the fulfillment of that call as each of us wishes it for himself or herself." (citations removed, spelling from original article)
18 Jean Porter, 'De Ordine Caritatis. Charity, Friendship and Justice in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica', The Thomist, p. 199
19 ST, II-II, Q.29, Art. 3
20 ST, II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1. This is the same concept seen in Augustine's "lowest peace" to which I refer above.
21 See, for example, Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle & John Finnis, 'Practical Principles, Moral Truth & Ultimate Ends', American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 32, 1987, pp. 99-151 at p. 106. "Within individuals and their personal lives, similar goods can be realized. For feelings can conflict among themselves and also can be at odds with one 's judgment s and choices. The harmony opposed to such inner disturbance is inner peace."
22 ST, II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1
War, subsequently, is a vice against charity; specifically, against peace. However, Aquinas is careful to make clear that some wars are not vicious, which is what leads to the commonly-held view that Aquinas is a just war theorist, and his theory is founded on an account of the virtues: war is justified on those occasions where it does not require actions that are uncharitable or attack peace, because charity and peace are traits which a person (and, to a lesser extent, a community) must possess in order to fully flourish.

Although Aquinas’ explicit writings on war focus on *jus ad bellum*, perhaps his most important contribution and continuing legacy has been in *jus in bello* through his discussion of intentionality and the doctrine of double-effect with regard to intentional killing. However, other contributions are also noteworthy; particularly important is the role of specific virtues in military reckonings.

These contributions have likely received less emphasis because they focus largely on the importance of virtues in the proper practice of war, and as such do not reflect the more deontic views of modern JWT; however they importantly suggest that the precepts of JWT require for their instantiation the presence of moral virtues in the agents over whom JWT holds sway. Furthermore, they imply that the practice of warfare can be conducive to human flourishing, claims which have failed to continue into modern-day JWTs.

---

33 See: *ST*, II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1. "And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers[...] so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies."


34 The Doctrine of Double-Effect has been so widely discussed throughout moral philosophy and just war theory that I take it as clear that all understand what it entails; I do not here have time to outline it. In short, Aquinas argues in a discussion on whether all killing is murder, that one can, in attempting to prevent being killed by an aggressor, defend oneself - even lethally - from harm so long as one’s intention is self-preservation, and any harm caused is a side-effect. See: *ST*, II-II, Q.64, Art. 7

What this means is I must not act with the intention of harming and/or killing the attacker. Murder, and any intentional harm, is evil and always forbidden; however, if evil happens co-incidentally in the pursuit of good, the agent may not be morally responsible under certain conditions. The circumstances under which double-effect can be employed are specified by Aquinas. He argues that moral responsibility for a bad consequence is alleviated if:

1. The act itself is not inherently evil;
2. The evil effect is not intended;
3. The evil effect is not means to the production of the good effect;
4. The good achieved by the action must outweigh the evil consequence.
Prudence, for Aquinas, is the special virtue of the cognitive faculty which allows man to decide between various paths of action. Aquinas goes on to suggest that prudence does not apply only to the individual, but has political relevance too. This includes, Aquinas notes, a specific type of prudence directed to military judgements, which is distinguished from political prudence in that each reflects a different part of nature: the ordering of the state corresponds to reason's governance over a thing, and the military defence of the state to the withstanding of external assailants, which is also natural.

[In] those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

This is important because the introduction of prudence into moral reasoning about war is new to JWT. Not only is prudent reasoning inherent in the practice of warfare, but, Aquinas importantly adds, participating in warfare can be - as a response to virtue - a constitutive aspect of the moral life generally; not only insofar as one fights for justice (if one has just cause), but also insofar as one is good at fighting; specifically, as we shall soon see, commanding.

Aquinas does not suggest that prudence is the virtue which governs all military conduct; ordinary soldiers do not need military prudence in order to function well in their role. "[T]he soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare." Aquinas explains the distinction between the soldier and the commander as one of virtue: issuing a command and bringing that command to fruition are very different things. "The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence."

So, although the prudent man is best equipped for military command, it is the fortitudinous man who is best suited for soldiering. Fortitude (more commonly called courage) is the virtue which allows man to pursue what he knows to be good despite the difficulties involved.

---

25 ST, II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5. "On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues." Also, the prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. [...] [T]he Philosopher [Aristotle] states that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled", it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel. ST, II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1. Aristotle citations removed.

26 ST, II-II, Q. 47, Art. 10. "Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude."

27 ST, II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4

28 ST, II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4

29 ST, II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4

30 ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1. [T]hrough the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. On order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite,
Aquinas follows Aristotle in believing that all virtues are the mean between two vices, meaning that fortitude is the moderation of two passions: fear and daring. More specifically, fear and daring in the face of death.

[F]ortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.

The warrior faces, almost uniquely, the opportunity to practice fortitude in his endeavours, because although "the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good [...] the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight."

Again, Aquinas demonstrates how the act of soldiering can be a constitutive element of the good life. The soldier can not only fight justly, but laudably too. However, the role of fortitude in good soldiering does call into question the Augustinian notion that the soldier is simply a sword in the hand of the ruler. Fortitude, as we have seem, is the moderation of fear of death in order to achieve goods which require risk. This means, as a matter of necessity, that fortitude requires a conception of the good aimed for; a cognitive assent that the end desired justifies the risk undertaken. This seems to imply that the courageous soldier will have at least considered, and be confident of, the justice of the cause for which he fights. Aquinas notes that "it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason," it follows then that if reason is not employed, the subsequent act cannot be fortitudinous. This places a 'burden of contemplation' on the soldier without which his act may not be unjust, but cannot be virtuous. It falls to the virtuous soldier to contemplate the justice of his cause before being willing to risk his life in its pursuit.

whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

31 See: Aristotle trans. Johnathan Barnes, *Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk. II, Ch. VI, 1106b24-28, in Johnathan Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume Two*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984. (All references to Aristotle hereafter will be from Barnes’ two volume translation). "Now excellence is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and both these things are characteristics of excellence. Therefore excellence is a kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate." For Aquinas’ echo of this view, see: *ST*, I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1 “Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions.”

32 ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3. “[F]ortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.”

33 ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4.

34 ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5. Although fortitude is certainly not limited to war: “a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.”

35 ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3.
So in light of this, how would Augustine and Aquinas describe the virtuous soldier? It seems that first and foremost, the virtuous soldier will be a *virtuous person*. They will be a person who habitually chooses actions that promote the good in a particular situation. For both, the virtuous soldier will be one who fears doing evil more than he fears dying and will courageously pursue the good even in the face of severe physical risk. The virtuous soldier is one who understands that his deeds as a soldier form part of his identity and need to be integrated with his life as a whole. Soldiering is a way of life that can either assist in the achievement of human flourishing or be detrimental to it, but it is not separate from the rest of my life; the way I soldier will affect the way I act when I am at home. John Courtney Murray spoke condemingly of a "false antinomy between war and morality,"\(^\text{39}\) with his focus being a view of war as a morally separate domain to the rest of our moral endeavours.

I am not sure that one should talk today in these categories, "war and/or peace," leaving unexamined the question just what their validity is as moral and political categories. The basic fallacy is to suppose that "war" and "peace" are two discontinuous and incommensurable worlds of existence and universes of discourse, each with its own autonomous set of rules, "peace" being the world of "morality" and "war" being the world of "evil," in such wise that there is no evil as long as there is peace and no morality as soon as there is war.\(^\text{37}\)

The virtue approach to JWT makes a similar point about attempts to divide morality into independent spheres, whereby my conduct as a soldier will not affect my conduct as a father and vice versa; these are misguided. Rather, military ethics *must* take an interest in the moral character of the soldier as well as their actions, and do what it can to protect or enhance that moral character, because doing otherwise may well be detrimental to the overall quality of the particular soldier’s moral life. It is on this basis that Nancy Sherman takes issue with Jeff McMahan’s view of unjust combatants as of morally inferior status to just combatants, and that as (at times) morally responsible for the injustice of their cause: \(^\text{38}\) it "seems too harsh and to miss too much about the practice of soldiering."\(^\text{39}\)

McMahan’s “harshness” is mitigated by the fact that he suggests three excusing conditions for unjust combatants: duress, which "include[s] threats to an agent that exert varying degrees of pressure against his will to resist"; epistemic limitations, where "[a] person’s knowledge of relevant matters may be limited or defective to varying degrees"; and diminished responsibility, whether or not a particular person has the "capacity for rational moral agency".\(^\text{40}\) However, a


\(^\text{38}\) *In Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer suggests that soldiers fighting on either side of a war are moral equals insofar as every soldier, regardless of cause, is afforded the right to kill his enemies: "they can try to kill me, and I can try to kill them." (Walzer, *JUW*, p. 36). The moral equality of combatants (MEC) famously rejected by Jeff McMahan in *Killing in War*, who compellingly argues that there is no philosophically coherent reason for why just combatants might have forfeited their right not to be killed. "It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks." (*KW*, p. 16)


\(^\text{40}\) McMahan, *KW*, pp. 116-117
virtue ethics approach would go further still, highlighting the important point that regardless of whether a soldier is morally justified in the way they act, that soldier can conduct himself in such a way as improves or diminishes the quality of his character, viz. a soldier fighting for an unjust cause may not be justified in doing so, but he can still fight well, with a firm desire for peace and a genuine intention to do good.

B: Modern JWT

When JWT enjoyed a strong revival in the 20th century, perhaps of its greatest spokespersons was Michael Walzer. In introducing his own JWT in Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer explicitly notes that it is founded in the concept of human rights.

There is a particular arrangement, a particular view of the moral world, that seems to me the best one. I want to suggest that the arguments we make about war are most fully understood (though other understandings are possible) as efforts to recognize and respect the rights of individuals and associated men and women. The morality I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights.\(^4\)

Walzer was not alone in this regard, (although Brian Orend suggests that "[i]t is in Walzer's book [...] that the cementing of human rights theory within the core propositions of just war theory occurs,"\(^4\)) in fact, the trend began earlier in response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "now theorists saw that the new moral basis for the age was destined to be human rights, and so they got to work interpreting traditional just war theory in light of human rights."\(^4\)

McMahan, too, formulates his theory in the language of human rights. McMahan objects to the moral equality of combatants on the basis that just combatants and unjust combatants enjoy different moral status; whilst just combatants have done nothing to forfeit their right not to be killed, unjust combatants have. McMahan similarly explains the shift away from virtue and natural law approaches and toward human-rights based approaches in terms of an interest in developing a 'Law of Armed Conflict' (LOAC) rather than a simple morality of war.

There are also historical reasons why people tend to conflate the morality and law of war. The moral theory of the just war antedated any serious legal regulation of war. When juridical thinkers began to develop accounts of the "law of nations," the framework within which they formulated their theories and proposals was inevitably provided by the prevailing

---

\(^4\) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th ed.) [JUW], Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. xxiii-xxiv. Walzer is quite vague on precisely what human rights are constituted in. See JUW, p. 54. "How these rights are themselves founded I cannot try to explain here. It is enough to say that they are somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a human being. If they are not natural, then we have invented them, but natural or invented, they are a palpable feature of our moral world.”

\(^4\) Brian Orend, The Morality of War, p. 24

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 23. It should come as no surprise that this is also Orend’s approach. Orend justifies war on the basis of states’ rights, which are in turn awarded on the basis that the state protects and upholds the human rights of its citizens. (p. 35)
understanding of natural law found in classical versions of just war theory. Legal principles were
thus couched in just war idioms. [...] 

As the legal regulation of war became more effective, particularly in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the practical significance of just war theory was gradually eclipsed by that
of the evolving law of war [...] Late twentieth-century just war doctrine was thus modeled quite
closely on the international law of war in the form that the latter took at that time. 

However, that none of these rights-based approaches is entirely unproblematic can be seen
from the way in which virtue and character-based concepts infiltrate their thinking in ways
that do not map clearly on to a rights-based JWT. For instance, when, in Arguing About War,
Walzer argues that "when it is our action that puts innocent people at risk, even if the action is
justified, we are bound to do what we can to reduce those risks, even if this involves risks to
our own soldiers," he makes the argument partly on the basis of civilian rights to immunity;
i.e. we ought to reduce collateral damage in war even if it enhances personal risk, but also
partly with reference to Albert Camus' argument that one cannot kill unless one is willing to
die. Camus argument could hardly be formulate as saying "only when one is willing to die does
one earn the right to kill another"; rather, what Camus (and, via citation, Walzer) is saying is
that there are particular attributes of moral character and a particular psychological state
requisite for an agent's killing to be just. These are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for
morally acceptable intentional killing. Implicit in Walzer's stance is an interest in character
and moral psychology that a purely rights-based approach cannot justify.

Consider another example, this time from Orend in his discussion of torture in The Morality of
War.

[At Abu Ghraib] the world saw some shocking photos of American troop conduct [...] Some of it
- like deliberate, prolonged sleep deprivation, and using dogs to attack or threaten already
prone and naked people - clearly violated the Geneva Conventions. Others might have been
visually disturbing but do not obviously count as human rights violations, such as forcing
the prisoners to wear dog collars, or having American women ridicule their private parts, or putting
female panties on their faces temporarily. 

Orend disapproves both types of actions as "a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the
principle of benevolent quarantine," but is not willing to completely condemn the latter: "I
suppose we might condone efforts at psychological pressure [...] when the goal is getting
information which might save innocent lives." It seems like Orend wants to condemn the
undignifying behaviour of US troops, but lacks the theoretical framework to do so; he notes

---

45 Walzer, Arguing About War, Yale University Press, London, 2004, p. 17
46 The accompanying conditions would be those that rights-theorists have done well to point out: that the person
being killed has somehow forfeited their right not to be killed by performing such-and-such an action.
47 Orend, The Morality of War, p. 111
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
that "[t]orture hardens the heart and corrupts the character of the torturer." But this is not exclusive to the torturer; the antagonistic interrogator, willing to mock, insult, lie and threaten surely cannot expect to leave with a pristine character - cannot this alone serve as a basis to condemn the behaviour? Again, Nancy Sherman is informative here:

The nearly exclusive focus on torture has silenced a more general debate about the moral shadowland in which the interrogator dwells, even when he does not practice torture [...] The space the interrogator inhabits has its own special moral demands. And with it comes a distinct set of moral and psychological vulnerabilities.

What Sherman is aware of – and which Orend is arguably less sensitive to – is the fact that even “interrogation-short-of-torture” (Sherman uses the term “exploitation”) brings accompanying moral difficulties for the interrogator. The subject’s vulnerability, loyalty and trust is exploited by the interrogator for specific ends; and the skills requisite to do so are not compatible with the overall flourishing of a life. In cases such as this, the soldier has not breached the Law of Armed Conflict, but in no way does this mean that the case is closed, morally speaking.

An analogy here can be drawn between interrogation and “friendly fire” accidents. Occasionally soldiers will kill one of their own in training mishaps, technological malfunctions or simple human error, most of the time being free from moral or legal fault for their actions. In such situations those who are responsible are usually only causally so; most times no moral or legal culpability can be attributed. To suggest on this basis though that there is no more work for moral philosophy to do here would be mistaken. JWT – if it is to be a complete morality of war – must accommodate discussions of character and moral psychology in such situations, appreciating that the deeds soldiers perform in war will follow them into civilian life. The same is true of the interrogator: it is not sufficient to say his deeds are morally acceptable (if, indeed, they are), JWT must take the further step of explaining how his actions can be reconciled with his life as a moral agent and with his overall flourishing.

I have alluded above to some ways in which I find contemporary rights-based JWT to be deficient, but that is a debate that must be continued elsewhere. For now, I will finish by suggesting how a modern-day JWT might describe the virtuous soldier in contrast to the fathers of JWT. In the next section, I will suggest that (to its credit) contemporary MEE correlates more strongly with the Augustinian/Thomistic model than it does with that of the modern day.

The virtuous soldier, under this approach, is more limited in the sense that his virtues are restricted to his role as a soldier. He has character traits that mean that he habitually adheres to the laws of armed combat and his character is compatible with the requirements of

---

50 Ibid., p. 112
51 The Untold War, p. 117
52 Sherman tells the story of one man, responsible for providing security for a position in Iraq who authorised a replacement battery for a Bradley gun. The replacement battery, as it turned out, had different amperage, and the gun fired, killing a US Private. See: Sherman, The Untold War, pp. 96-97
soldiering to uphold human rights. The virtuous soldier may be one who sees his own role as intrinsically connected to the code of conduct which governs his actions, as Paul Robinson notes:

"The four virtuous of prowess, courage, loyalty, and truthfulness form the unchanging core of military honour [...] Many societies create formal codes of behaviour which prescribe how to display the approved virtues. Unfortunately, in yet another complication, this means that honour can derive from rigid obedience of the code even when it is unhelpful or even clearly wrong."

There are two significant observations from Robinson. The first is that there is no mention of prudence, autonomy or conscience amongst the important character traits of the honourable soldier, meaning that the soldier's role as a free-thinking, autonomous agent (as he is in his life outside the military) is undermined. Under such an approach, the virtuous soldier is paradoxically required to separate himself from fundamental human characteristics. The flaw in this approach is noted by Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, who argues that a Kantian approach to moral education might be beneficial in the military: "[t]he goal of moral education [...] is not merely to get the agent to follow rules. It is the cultivation of moral agency, an agency that involves one's becoming an independent, right thinking and right acting person."

Secondly, any approach which prioritises codes of conduct in its approach to ethics will interpret the virtues in such a way as favours the code; it will never be virtuous to disobey. This type of approach, which in some ways is necessary for the military to function at the same time undermines the capacity of the soldier to act in "good faith" when faced with serious moral dilemmas.

Virtue and Military Ethics Education

If there was any uncertainty as to whether the division between old and new concepts of virtue in JWT had carried over to MEE, Paul Robinson's observation in the introduction to the collected volume Ethics Education in the Military ends it:

"... for some ethics is synonymous with 'morality'. The aim of ethics education, therefore, is seen as being what many refer to as 'character development', in other words the creation of morally upright persons through the instillation of certain key qualities or dispositions of character (commonly known as virtues). Others, however, disagree, and consider ethics to be somewhat...

53 Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, p. 3
55 This argument, regarding the necessity of obedience for military functioning is one which McMahan calls "The Duty to Sustain the Efficient Functioning of Just Institutions", (KW, p. 70) is predicated on the fact that "[m]ilitary institutions have to be able to react quickly and efficiently in moments of crisis," and therefore "individuals within the military must fulfil their assigned roles in a consistent and predictable manner" (71). McMahan rejects this claim for two reasons: first, because in conflicts between institutional duties and other duties "there can be no a priori guarantee that institutional duties will be overriding" (72); and second, because "that [institutional] duty is generated only within military institutions that are just." (73)
distinct from general morality. Instead, ethics are more properly seen as being related to a given profession and its requirements. The focus of ethics education therefore shifts from character development to creating an understanding of the purpose and methods of the profession and the values which underpin it.56

These two contrasting approaches suggest different approaches to military ethics: the latter limiting it to a set of clearly defined and codified rules, where adherence to the rules counts as ethical conduct; whilst the former takes a more holistic approach, apparently believing that moral conduct in the military is synonymous with “what the virtuous soldier would do”, where it is assumed that a virtuous person will also be a virtuous soldier. Although both these approaches are commonly seen in ethics education, it is clear that one is waxing and the other waning, as Robinson notes, “the predominant principle which most military ethics education programmes have adopted is that of virtue ethics.”57

However, in the same volume, Don Carrick is sceptical of the practical viability of a virtue ethics approach to military ethics serving as an appropriate normative guide for soldiers. “If the educators want to bring virtue ethics, care ethics and so on in to the pedagogic equation, then they run a serious risk of taking the soldier outside his role and into situations where he does no longer have a reliable moral compass to guide him; he can find himself having to deal with people ‘simply’ on the basis of common humanity, fellow-feeling and a universal morality.58

Carrick’s fear is that relying on universal, ‘everyday morality’ to govern warfare will generate a kind of “moral schizophrenia” because soldiering involves deeds that defy everyday morality, such as intentional killing.59 As such, it is preferable to educate soldiers so that they see the practice of soldiering as a separate moral realm from that of everyday life. As such, Carrick advocates “ring-fencing soldiering within the notion of professional role morality.60

It is particularly curious that Carrick argues in favour of a role morality approach because of moral schizophrenia given that Sherman argues that such schizophrenia is unavoidable and is in large part due to the huge gulf between “peacetime” and “wartime” morality.

“Border passing” – that is, moving between civilian roles and the roles required in uniform and in war – is neither morally nor psychologically simple. The passage can subject both psychologically strong and morally good persons to feelings of shame and remorse, as well as to traumatic symptoms. In Quinn’s [the interrogator Sherman is interviewing] case, deception and betrayal, manipulation and exploitation, tools morally questionable in ordinary transactions, had become standard tools of his specialized trade. And this did not sit perfectly well.61

57 Ibid., p. 5
58 Don Carrick, ‘The Future of Ethics Education in the Military’, in ibid., p. 197
59 Ibid., pp. 195-196
60 Ibid., p. 196
61 The Untold War, p. 115
Carrick’s suggestion is that if soldiers are only informed by “everyday morality”, and have to “deal with people ‘simply’ on the basis of common humanity, fellow-feeling and a universal morality,” they will be less able to make decisions vital to the successful fulfilment of their role as soldiers. Sherman, realising that what a person does actually affects the type of person he is, highlights the reverse: if soldiers are encouraged to think of “soldiering” as entirely separate from other walks of life, there will be inevitable “seepage” where aspects of their soldiering are habituated, or haunt them in the form of guilt in so small part because of the stark difference between the now-separate moral realms of civilian and soldier life.

It is worth asking on what basis Carrick justifies his claim that if soldiers were to make decisions solely on the basis of a common morality that they would be unable to perform their roles as soldiers well. The argument is as follows:

My concerns can [be] encapsulated in a simple imperative; one fundamental objective of any ethics education programme must be to protect the soldier against the sort of moral schizophrenia that can affect anyone who is brought up on a diet of unqualified moral rules (do not lie, Do not break other people’s things, Do not harm, Do not kill) but who is then told that he is entirely justified in going out and doing the exact opposite, namely undertaking as much breaking, harming and killing as possible.

Besides taking issue with the straw-man claim that soldiers are told to break, harm and kill “as much as possible”, we should question why it is the case that developing two distinct sets of rules for two distinct contexts is the ideal way to protect against moral schizophrenia – particularly when Sherman’s empirical research suggests otherwise. Might it not be more fruitful to explain to soldiers that, as the classical just war theorists believed, what is morally important is to act virtuously in war – with charity, courage, prudence, loyalty, etc... and thus fostering virtues that are equally welcome in home life and war time? This is why Aquinas chooses to situate his discussion of war within the virtues rather than within discussions of justice, because he believes that ethical conduct in war requires the same character traits and does ethical conduct in other walks of life.

That military ethics should be considered a branch of professional ethics (but not necessarily a role morality) has also been argued in a very different way by Martin Cook and Henrik Syse, who argue that “[f]irstly and most importantly, military ethics is a species of the genus ‘professional ethics’. That is to say, it exists to be of service to professionals who are not themselves specialists in ethics but who have to carry out the tasks entrusted to the profession as honorably and correctly as possible.” However, Syse and Cook’s standard of professional ethics is different from Carrick’s: “The test is fairly simple here: is what’s going on [...] the sort

\[62\] Carrick, ‘The Future of Ethics Education in the Military’, p. 197

\[63\] Gregory Reichberg highlights the importance of recognising this to a proper understanding of Aquinas’ JWT. See: Gregory M. Reichberg, ‘Aquinas’ Moral Typology of Peace and War’, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 64, 2011, pp. 467-487

of thing that might be helpful in providing real-world guidance for policy-makers, military commanders and leaders, or operational decision-making?\textsuperscript{65}

In fact, Cook and Syse at no point suggest that military ethics is reducible to a set of laws, that right conduct in warfare consists only in rule adherence or that soldiers’ morality is different from that of the everyday. What they note is simply that military ethics is first and foremost about training ethical practitioners of warfare; any academic endeavour that is not directed to this end “are more marginal, ancillary, or perhaps essentially irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{66} In fact, they speak somewhat disparagingly of military lawyers rehearsing the LOAC to fulfil their annual training requirements, suggesting that ethical training involves much more than rote-learning the rules.\textsuperscript{67} What it requires, I want to suggest, is (a) the development of virtuous habits within those who will find themselves a part of the theatre of war, and (b) that the normative theory by which we evaluate actions conducted in war, JWT, hold a special, central place for virtue so that soldiers, politicians, officers and educators alike recognise that questions of virtue, character and moral psychology are not peripheral issues to military ethics, but sit at the heart of the field.

Ethics educators have increasingly seen the importance of fostering virtuous soldiers as a means to ensuring that wars are fought ethically. Here ethics is not necessarily understood simply as rule-adherence, as Alexander Mosely notes: “to raise the individual soldier up from an uncritical level to the philosophical realm [...] can lead to a rejection, at any time, of the armed forces demands, commands, and even contract.”\textsuperscript{68} Ethics teachers have become aware that the project of ensuring that a soldier does what is right in a situation is greatly assisted by ensuring that soldier is, at his heart, a good person. This allows us to recognise the end of MEE, but what remains to be seen is what form it should take in order to achieve this goal.

**Liberal Arts and Military Education**

I believe the traditional liberal arts approach to education can support MEE in achieving the ends established above. The understanding of liberal arts I will be applying here is that which originated in the Catholic University tradition, explained by Jeffry Davis as “interdisciplinary thinking guided by the great questions of the human condition: “Who am I?” and “How should I live?”\textsuperscript{69} In short, the liberal arts education aims not just to teach students how to excel at whatever vocation they may have chosen, but how to excel as citizens and as moral persons. This section will focus on three aspects of liberal arts education, so understood – interdisciplinarity, the development of intellectual curiosity and the focus on morality as being concerned with the overall goodness of a life - and examine how they might contribute to the goals of MEE.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 120
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 119
\textsuperscript{68} Alexander Mosely, ‘The Ethical Warrior: A Classical Liberal Approach’ in Ethics Education in the Military, pp. 184-185
\textsuperscript{69} Jeffry C. Davis, ‘The Virtue of Liberal Arts: Quintilian and Character Education’, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 19, Iss. 1/2, 2007, pp. 61-80 at p. 65
The appeal of the liberal arts as an interdisciplinary approach to education, whereby students become familiar with a host of different areas of study (history, philosophy, psychology, science, sociology, politics, etc.) is that it provides students with applicable knowledge in a variety of different situations. Because of this, it is impossible to list all the possible benefits of interdisciplinarity to someone in a military context. However, I will suggest one here: most important, I believe, is some formal training in psychology.\(^{70}\) I have repeatedly cited instances where current trends in JWT underemphasise the psychological trials of soldiers at war, and the hardships they face. One way in which the military establishment could assist soldiers is by talking in advance about emotions they are likely to experience: guilt, regret, shame, anger, hate, vengeance, and giving them an opportunity to understand them as moral and psychological phenomena. In her classic work, *The Fragility of Goodness*, Martha Nussbaum assesses in depth the substantial role that luck and the emotions play in the Ancient Greek moral tradition. When talking about the work’s modern-day relevance, she suggests that:

> Thinking well about what emotions are can help us defend better the general thesis of *Fragility* about their cognitive role. In the process, it reveals both some risks we run by trusting to their guidance and some previously unacknowledged prospects for personal and social progress.\(^{71}\)

This is the role that psychological training in the military could play: awareness of the significant role of emotions in the moral lives of soldiers, and also a way of cautioning soldiers against valuing the emotions too strongly.

Another benefit of the interdisciplinary approach of the liberal arts is that its classical interest provides a wealth of rich, sophisticated examples of moral and immoral conduct within warfare to assess. This provides not only a subject for philosophical analysis and inquiry, but also inspiration on an emotional level, as Cook and Syse suggest (with caution) that:

> [T]here is some role for the hortatory in professional military ethics. Perhaps especially in a profession which requires courage and spirit (what the Greeks called thumos), non-rational appeals that motivate have a role in encouraging those very attitudes and behaviors. Tales and examples of exemplary individuals and actions can provide us with role-models and motivation at a level deeper than rational analysis. But they also need to be used with caution - they can easily misfire and produce cynicism. And of course selecting the appropriate examples and heroes presupposes an antecedent grasp of excellence in military conduct and virtue.\(^{72}\)

The second element of the liberal arts which is consistent with the goals of MEE is the development of a spirit of questioning and critical thinking. Recalling firstly McMahan’s view of a soldier’s personal responsibility for the immorality of the cause he fights for, a soldier’s

---

\(^{70}\) Another obvious candidate for a military-oriented liberal arts education is history; specifically, military history. I omit it from discussion here because it already forms an important part of officer training.


\(^{72}\) Cook & Syse, ‘What Should We Mean by Military Ethics?’, p. 121
ability to think critically about ethics and justice is vital to their ability to perform their role ethically.\textsuperscript{73} Again, Cook & Syse note that “critical assessment of LOAC is a fundamental component of military ethics, understood as professional ethics”,\textsuperscript{74} and as Mosely noted above, the free and fully functioning soldier should be able to disobey a command at any time, but to be able to do so requires that soldiers possess the ability to think critically and analyse concepts well. Secondly, thinking critically and reason about how one ought to live one’s life falls under the domain of the virtue prudence, which (as I earlier noted) Aquinas emphasised as the central virtue of the military commander. Insofar as the liberal arts are able to instil critical analysis skills in its graduates, it will be preparing them to excel in their role as military commanders under the classical model of JWT.

Finally, and to my mind most importantly, the liberal arts encourages students to think about morality as a system that evaluates the overall goodness of a life, and each act as contributing to or detracting from that goodness. In this sense, it is profoundly Aristotelian. However, it also serves to support a view of soldiering as connected to the other aspects of one’s moral life; what I do as a soldier is not separate from the rest of my identity. In the British Military, David Rodin advised educators to encourage their students to achieve a Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium,”\textsuperscript{75} that is, to “‘test” various parts of our system of beliefs against the other beliefs we hold, looking for ways in which some of these beliefs support others, seeking coherence among the widest set of beliefs, and revising and refining them at all levels when challenges to some arise from others.”\textsuperscript{76} Such an approach encourages students to think about the obligations the military holds them to and evaluate their consistency with other moral values the students hold. This, rather than the development of a “role morality” appears to me to be the ideal way to genuinely protect students from moral schizophrenia.

Of course, the typical graduate coming out of liberal arts colleges today is probably not going to be equipped with the knowledge or character traits necessary to perform well in a military context. I do not mean by the above that a standard liberal arts education is sufficient as military training, even on the level of developing virtues or critical thinking skills. These things must be tailored to be specifically relevant to a military context. This point was made in a superb article by Deane-Peter Baker in the most recent issue of the Journal of Military Ethics.

Those who are proponents of a more ‘purely philosophical’ approach to the core military ethics course seem to make the assumption, implicitly or explicitly, that critical reasoning skills are a kind of by-product of formal education which emerge and develop in the process of subject-specific learning, and that formal education itself constitutes training in critical reasoning […]

Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. […] It seems, then, that to be maximally

\textsuperscript{73} See KW, Chapter Three, ‘Excuses’

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 120

\textsuperscript{75} Patrick Mileham, ‘Teaching Military Ethics in the British Armed Forces’, in Robinson, de Lee & Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military, p. 51

effective, a core military ethics course must deliberately do both things, that is, impart a core framework of ethical theory and provide guided practice in sound moral reasoning.\footnote{Deane-Peter Baker, ‘Making Good Better: A Proposal for Teaching Ethics at the Service Academies’, \textit{Journal of Military Ethics}, Vol. 11, Iss. 3, pp. 208-222 at p. 212}

**Training and Practice: JWT and MEE**

Before closing, I want to briefly explain why I consider the discrepancy between modern JWT as rights-based and modern MEE as virtue based to be problematic. To my mind, there are three serious reasons why this might represent an obstacle to moral behaviour within the military. The first is that soldiers entering the military are entering an environment in which the model of moral behaviour they have habituated will not fit neatly, and just as virtue can be learned, so too it can be forgotten. If the military establishment, informed largely by the LOAC and (to a lesser extend) JWT is not willing or able to develop a culture that welcomes and supports virtuous behaviour, the virtues will fade over time. After all, as Aristotle explains, virtues are acquired and strengthened through deeds.

Secondly, if students become aware that the military establishment uses a model of moral evaluation that de-emphasises virtue, then the legitimacy of the virtue education given by MEE will be undermined. Just as “ordinary” students treat optional or unexamined course material will less dedication, so too will students knowing that upon graduation, all of their ethics training will count for naught. Indeed, it runs the further risk that even the military’s ethical standards may be de-emphasised for the same reason: students have learned that ethics is valued less highly than other characteristics.

Thirdly, it is possible that different systems of moral evaluation between training (which emphasises the development of a particular type of character) and practice (which demands obedience to rules which may run contrary to the virtues previously developed) will generate the type of moral schizophrenia that Carrick was concerned about earlier. Thus the inconsistency between JWT and MEE may place graduates at risk of psychological harm and moral uncertainty about how to act.

**Conclusions**

This paper has tried (perhaps over ambitiously) to do several things. First it has aimed to show the historical differences between the classical founders JWT and the theory as it appears in the modern day. The difference largely concerns the role of virtue within the theory. I have argues against the modern conception of JWT as predominantly rights-centric on the basis that (a) it ignores the reality that soldiers need to be able to reconcile their deeds as soldiers with their moral lives generally, and (b) virtue-talk infiltrates these rights-based theories in ways which they seem unaware of. Furthermore, I have argued that the image of the virtuous soldier presented by the classical approach is the more convincing, not least because it comports better with new developments in MEE, which are beginning to consider the role of military ethics to extend beyond simple rule adherence. Finally, I have suggested some ways in
which a modified liberal arts approach might support the goals of this new attitude to MEE and noted why the inconsistency between JWT and MEE should be disturbing to anyone interested in ensuring that war is practiced within the requirements of justice, and in ways that best furthers the flourishing of all involved, citing three reasons: environmental discrepancies, the devaluation of ethics generally, and the risk of moral schizophrenia. By way of closing I want to note (obviously) that I find these new trends in MEE to be particularly encouraging, and hold high hopes that some of the revived interest in virtue might gradually find its way into new discussions of JWT.

Bibliography


Elshtain, Jean Bethke, Just War Against Terror, Basic Books, New York, 2003


McMahan, Jeff, Killing in War (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009


Robinson, Paul, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq, Routledge, New York, 2006


Scott Davis, Grady, Warcraft and the Fragility of Virtue: An Essay in Aristotelian Ethics, WIPF & Stock, Oregon, 1992

Sherman, Nancy, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind, OUP, Oxford, 2005


Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977

--------- Arguing About War, Yale University Press, London, 2004