Do we find any end to the need of interpreting? . . . There is more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret things; and more books upon books than upon any other subjects: we do nothing but comment upon one another. Every place swarms with commentaries. . . . It is not the common and final end of all studies?—Montaigne *Essays*

If wars are too important to be left to the generals, international crises are too dangerous to be left exclusively to the social scientists. To paraphrase Epictetus, it is not the world that is the source of our crises, but our *interpretation* of the world. The interpretive methods of the humanities are attuned to the rapidly changing context of international relations: a milieu that transforms political actors from observers of unambiguous facts to interpreters and authors of cryptic texts and symbolic performances. And those who study crises are not observers of obdurate facts; they are denizens of the archives, not the laboratories. Indeed, not unlike medieval monks, even an unreconstructed positivist pours over texts, reading interpretations into hallowed documents. Even so, social scientists seem reluctant to acknowledge that they engage in literary projects. As Clifford Geertz remarked:

> Many of them [social scientists] have taken an essentially hermeneutic—or, if that word frightens, conjuring up images of biblical zealots . . . and Teutonic professors, an “interpretive”—approach to their task.¹

October surprises illustrate Epictetus’ ancient wisdom. April may be the cruelest month, but October is the month of international crises: These episodes, in effect, provide a window through which we witness (to the extent that declassified documents are available) decision-makers hazarding urgent, fateful decisions. Crises occur on the cusp between war and peace; decision-makers agonize about whether to muster words or arms to restore the status quo ante.

One October day—it doesn’t seem that long ago—American officials discovered they had been deceived by Soviet diplomats. U-2 reconnaissance revealed the surreptitious construction of a Soviet nuclear base in Cuba, a mere ninety miles from American shores. A prominent presidential advisor warned the base was a “quantum leap” in Soviet strategic capability—in short, a crisis. Department of Defense officials concurred. The national security advisor contacted the president immediately.
Speaking of surprises, I’m not talking about the unforgettable Cuban missile crisis of 1962; I just sketched the all-but-forgotten Cienfuegos Bay episode of 1970. Nuclear submarines operating out of Cienfuegos Bay posed a more formidable threat than the readily detectable, land-based missiles of 1962: Kissinger rightly saw mobile, undetectable submarines as a quantum leap in the Soviet threat. He interpreted intelligence reports as a crisis, an unexpected challenge demanding urgent attention and resolution. Nixon, however, didn’t share Kissinger’s interpretation; he underplayed, if not ignored, the Soviet challenge. These dramatically different responses reveal that a crisis is a concept, not a thing—a matter of interpretation. As political theorist Murray Edelman explains: “A crisis, like other news developments, is a creation of the language used to depict it; the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a fact or a rare situation.”

Accordingly, a hermeneutic approach to crises contextualizes events and seeks to understand a decision-maker’s language. An initial take on the historical background renders Nixon’s indifference truly puzzling. At first blush, it would seem that Nixon’s defining moment was at hand—the once in a lifetime opportunity to burnish his redoubtable, anticommmunist credentials, the ultimate test of his mettle and his presidency. The time had come to prove he was a better man than Kennedy. During the 1960 campaign, Kennedy charged Nixon with being soft on Cuba. (Nixon didn’t reveal Eisenhower’s secret plan for a Bay of Pigs invasion.) To understate the case, an enraged Nixon returned the favor. He never tired of chastising Kennedy for vacillation and weakness in managing JFK’s bravura crisis: Kennedy’s “weak-kneed” response to the crisis put “The Atlantic alliance in disarray, Cuba is western Russia, and the rest of Latin America is in deadly peril.”

It was as if the Soviets invited Nixon to his defining crisis, if not the gravest crisis of the nuclear age. Nixon, much to Kissinger’s dismay, found it inconvenient to attend. According to Kissinger, the president was distracted by others matters, thought it unwise to have a crisis close to the election (his motives might be suspect), and—again according to Kissinger—Nixon had his heart set on visiting the Mediterranean to watch the Sixth Fleet fire its guns.
The facts didn’t speak for themselves—they seldom do. There was no doubt about the facts, namely the construction of the Soviet base. As Kissinger explains: “There was no dispute about the facts; all agreed that a base capable of servicing nuclear submarines was being built...”

Nixon ignored the threat and didn’t let it spoil his vacation. He instructed his advisors not to make a crisis move. Advisors on the WASG (Washington Strategic Action Group) followed orders, and construed the base as a problem: an issue to be resolved quietly and diplomatically in due course, perhaps at the scheduled June summit conference. However, relying upon his legendary legerdemain, Kissinger dismissed Nixon and the WSAG as amateurs, circumvented orders, met secretly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, and reestablished the status quo ante through negotiations. The prudent resolution of what might have become the gravest confrontation of the nuclear age is all but forgotten, even among the participants themselves. (Could it be that successful diplomacy conducted without alarm and fanfare lacks the panache of reckless, public confrontations?)

The stark differences between the 1962 and 1970 episodes raise challenging questions beyond the pale of standard, social scientific approaches to international crises. Why did comparable events—the surreptitious construction of Soviet nuclear bases in Cuba—evoke radically different responses on the part of Kennedy and Nixon? Specifically, why did Kennedy take grave risks* while Nixon remained indifferent?

Political scientists such as Robert Jervis argue the discrepancies in decision-making are due to disparities in perception generated by different modes of cognitive processing. To be sure, humans have cognitive needs—a will to truth: We need to know what is happening. But men don’t live by cognition alone. Perception is not conceptualization. Our conceptualization of the world, our “meaning-making” reflects teleological, normative, and performative needs. Experience without meaning is—well—meaningless. Simply put, confronting an unanticipated experience, decision-makers need to understand: why it’s happening; what is expected of them; and what actions should follow—again, a matter of interpretation.
The risks hazarded during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis are well known and won’t be recounted here. By most accounts, it was the closest the world came to full-scale thermonuclear war.

Crisis are about more than interpreting and authoring texts to restore the international order; they have a neglected, profoundly personal dimension, a dimension that determines whether a text will be construed as a crisis in the first place. A crisis, in effect, is an historical analogy. The present is likened to the past. (Those who can’t forget the past are condemned to repeat it.) A crisis is self-confessional. Specifically, a decision-makers interprets a new text as a crisis when they liken it to a crisis narrative of the remembered past. In the case of the subjects of this study, this remembered past is inscribed in their writing. Accordingly, I turn to these texts to decipher their concepts of “crisis.”

As we’ll see, Kennedy, Kissinger, and Nixon improvised dramatically different narratives. Not surprisingly, these narratives are manifest in a decision-maker’s crisis texts such as Nixon’s Six Crises. Even so, these improvisations share a common denominator. In the words of cultural anthropologist Victor Turner, they are “life-crisis dramas”: crises of identity, rites of passage that test a would-be hero’s mettle by revealing the truth about men and events. I found a remarkable correspondence between a decision-makers’ accounts of crises of the past and the crises they constructed and promoted while in office.

Traveling in Hermeneutic Circles

A physicist friend of mind once said in facing death he drew some consolation from the reflection that he would never again have to look up the word “hermeneutics” in the dictionary.

—Steven Weinberg

The remainder of this paper offers a mercifully brief—but hopefully useful—hermeneutic primer. In addition, I also a gloss on the Cuban missile crisis that reveals the unacknowledged hermeneutic ruminations that marked those harrowing thirteen days. Finally, I sketch a hermeneutic approach that explains why decision-makers interpret a text as a crisis in the first place. The stark contrast between Kennedy, Kissinger, and Nixon crises narratives accounts for Nixon’s puzzling indifference.
Let’s begin with a primer. Truth be known, hermeneutics—the signature of the human sciences—is neither complicated nor impenetrable. It’s origins can be traced to the myth of Hermes—the messenger of the gods. Hermes, son of Zeus, was charged with interpreting the creeds and passions of the gods to mortals. But Hermes, himself a god, was not content to be a mere messenger. He was privy to great secrets—mysteries unknown even to the other gods. Unlike Prometheus, he was not a trustworthy friend to humanity. True, at times Hermes warned mortals of impending disaster. But he often toyed with hapless mortals, often for the perverse pleasure of deceiving vainglorious humanity and assuring their hubris. He was the consummate trickster, a wily deceiver who tricked Zeus himself. This dissembling deity could well be venerated as the patron god of diplomacy and crisis management.

The myth spawned hermeneutics. It originated with medievalists who combined inspiration and arcane rules to divine the true meaning of ambiguous Scripture. In the hands of recent philosophers and anthropologists, it evolved into diverse methods designed to interpret the ambiguities of human experience. And, as previously suggested, studies of international crises have an unacknowledged hermeneutic dimension. As Geertz explains:

Doing ethnography [or constructing and explicating crises] is like trying to read . . . a manuscript—foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherence, suspicious emendations and tendentious commentaries.¹⁰

Ambiguous texts are the materiel of crisis construction and promotion. I hasten to add a caveat: I recognize that the notion of “text” is elastic and overused. My suggestion that a crisis is an ambiguous text is literal not metaphorical. As the Cuban missile crisis illustrates, crises are about cryptic reconnaissance data, intelligence communiqués, and guided missives authored by adversaries. Typically, decision-makers respond with dissembling replies that threaten on the cheap. Crisis texts seldom lend themselves to unequivocal interpretation; indeed, they are often intended to equivocate. Not surprisingly, the exchange of such texts, along with symbolic performances, spark acrimonious disputes among adversaries and crisis managers themselves.¹¹
Consider the hermeneutic ruminations of Kennedy and his closest advisors. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis began when McGeorge Bundy awakened the Kennedy and proffered his crisis interpretation of CIA intelligence reports; the President endorsed his advisor’s interpretation. Not everyone agreed. Initially, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson interpreted the reports as a problem to be resolved patiently and quietly under the auspices of the United Nations. Succumbing, perhaps to “group-think,” the ambassador famously represented the missiles as a crisis before the United Nations.

The president and his advisors knew what occurred, but agonized about why it occurred and what was expected of them. Soviet texts cried out for interpretation; crisis management became a literary project. (There must have been apprehension about losing something in the translation.) In opposition to those who urged immediate military action, Secretary of Defense McNamara stressed that crisis management and resolution were about communications, not ordnance:

> For twelve days I lived in the Pentagon . . . because I feared that they [the military] might not understand that this was a communication exercise, not a military operation . . . [I was] trying to send a message, not start a war. This was not a blockade, but a means of communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev.\(^\text{12}\)

Kennedy and his advisors (the Ex Comm) speculated as to why the Soviets deployed the missiles, struggled to read between the lines in Khrushchev’s messages, and like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, sought the magic words to make their troubles vanish.

The most harrowing crisis of that bipolar disorder known as the Cold War was, to be sure, many things. However, the hermeneutic ruminations, the literary projects, are seldom given their due. Just as monks pondered why Paul wrote a second epistle to the Corinthians, Kennedy and his associates were puzzled by Khrushchev’s two inconsistent messages—especially his bellicose final missive. The “best and the brightest” responded with a celebrated literary maneuver, the “Trollope ploy.” Mimicking the ingénue in the Victorian novel, they ignored the disagreeable message and responded to the words they wanted to hear. Kennedy expected the worst but hoped for the best—exegesis is a risky business.

But why do decision-makers conceptualize a text as a crisis in the first place? To reiterate: I argue that a text is conceptualized as a crisis when it is likened to a previous
crisis narrative indelibly etched in an actor’s memory and inscribed in his texts—a saga remembered as a critical juncture requiring urgent, perilous choices. Fortunately for my purposes, “crisis” was an idée fixe for Kennedy, Kissinger, and Nixon—it exaggerates little to claim they wrote about nothing else.

Ancient crisis narrative still resonate. Thinkers such as Thucydides and Habermas suggest that two archetypal narratives are invoked to construct crises. These narratives inform Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage, Kissinger’s A World Restored, and Nixon’s Six Crises.

1. An existential narrative, a daring strategy for accomplishing momentous feats: A would-be hero makes a name for himself by revealing his true character. To paraphrase Nietzsche, “[Existential] crises show that there are still things that men prize more than life and property.” In this familiar, formulaic narrative, the protagonist no longer enjoys his charmed life. Fate casts him into the defining crisis of his life: a dark night of the soul in which he is scourged by humiliation and self-doubt. Overcoming such trials and tribulations the politician turned statesman works wonders in history.

2. A clinical narrative, expert tactics for averting disaster: the bailiwick of the premier, once in a generation specialist. The clinician, in effect, likens himself to Plato’s physician/statesman—a genius at diagnosing and treating afflictions of the international body politic. The physician/statesman is wise and realistic. He (or she—Plato was remarkably free of sexism on this account) restores homeostasis in the body politic. And yet, he realizes that a healthy international order with its proper balance of forces is temporary—quests for perpetual peace express dangerous, wishful thinking. Not known for excessive modesty, Dr. Kissinger believed he played the part. He recounts his solemn calling: “He [Kissinger] owes it to his people to strive, to create, and to resist the decay that besets all human institutions.”

Kennedy’s two books, Profiles in Courage and Why England Slept, reveal his notion of crisis: an existential narrative, a daring strategy for accomplishing heroic feats in harrowing dramas that test a man’s mettle. Profiles in Courage narrates the heroic journey of eight senators who immortalize themselves by confronting their ultimate life crises. Rebounding from failures, enduring the calumny of colleagues and countrymen, they respond courageously by resolving dangerous, ambiguous challenges. Such courage
is not foolhardy, impulsive bravado; on the contrary, it is bravery guided by intelligence—grace under pressure.

Was the Cuban missile crisis derivative? Did Kennedy have himself in mind when he recounted the tribulations of another Massachusetts senator, John Quincy Adams? Did Kennedy identify with Adams because of common failures and indiscretions? He cites Adams’ diary: “Passions, indolence, weakness, and infirmities have made me swerve from my better knowledge of right and almost constantly paralyzed my effort of good.” Adams, we are told, displayed grace under pressure by supporting a blockade of the British fleet. (The British, of course protested. Documents obtained from the National Security Archive indicate that Her Majesty also protested Kennedy’s blockade of Cuba.)

Kennedy thought crises would enable him to make a name for himself. Unfortunately, he didn’t get the ones he wanted. He took responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, endured Khrushchev’s bravado and insults in Vienna, and suffered ridicule as the Berlin Wall divided the city. His vow to keep offensive Soviet weapons out of Cuba became the ultimate test of his presidency and place in history.

Press Secretary Pierre Salinger recounts his conversation with Kennedy when the president planned a hasty return to Washington to be briefed on Soviet missiles in Cuba. The public was told the president had the flu. Salinger told the president: “You know you don’t have the flu, you look perfectly well.” The president replied: “That’s true, you’ll find out why I’m going back to Washington when we get there, and when you do, grab your balls!”

Why did the missiles hit below the belt? Why did Kennedy take Khrushchev’s actions personally. What was the threat? Neither the president nor his closest advisors believed Soviet actions increased the threat to the survival of the United States. Sorensen summarizes the consensus that emerged:
It is generally agreed that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of power—i.e., the do not increase the potential megatonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil.\(^{21}\)

Kennedy attached surplus meaning to Soviet actions. He interpreted the missiles of October as a dire threat to his integrity. Like the senators in *Profiles in Courage*, he faced the existential moment of truth: Could he keep his covenant with himself?

Kissinger’s theory and practice embodies the clinical crisis narrative. Deconstructing Kissinger carries us beyond the diplomatic intrigues of the Congress of Vienna, beyond the Baroque palaces, to the columns of ancient Athens and visions of Plato’s physician/statesman. Such a man is accountable to no one, and is permitted—no obligated—to use any means necessary to heal and preserve the international body politic, if only for a time. As Plato counseled in the *Statesman*:

> It makes no difference whether . . . [a statesman’s] subjects be willing or unwilling: they may rule with or without a code of laws. It is the same with doctors. We do not assess the medical qualifications of a doctor by the degree of willingness . . . to submit to their painful treatment. Doctors are still doctors whether they work according to fixed prescriptions or without them.\(^{22}\)

Unlike Kennedy who recklessly sought existential heroism, Kissinger saw himself as the serene, unperturbed expert, the “Doctor of Diplomacy” (in the words of a biographer) both knowledgeable and wise. Overly confident of his abilities, he had no need to play by the rules. He mocked the amateurs in the Nixon administration and ridiculed the bureaucracy who would interfere with his practice. (After reading his *Diplomacy*, it appears that most debacles of the past occurred because Kissinger himself was unavailable to properly titrate the balance of power.) As a biographer notes: “[Kissinger] is a solitary actor or nothing.”\(^{23}\)

Since Nixon and the WSAG misdiagnosed the Soviet threat, Kissinger would use any means necessary to restore homeostasis to the body politic. He had to defy the president and meet with Dobrynin to restore the status quo ante. He heeded Machiavelli’s advice: It is “necessary to know well how to disguise . . . and to be a great pretender and dissembler.”\(^{24}\) Kissinger’s account of his dissembling (is a self-confessed dissembler to be believed?) would bedazzle Hermes himself. According to Kissinger, he conjured up a
carefully crafted mixture of ambiguity, half-truth, and reverse psychology designed keep influential senators out of the picture while giving the Soviets a chance to save face.

Somehow—despite Nixon’s orders—the Soviet nuclear base got leaked to the public. Kissinger used the leak as a pretext for a press conference to assert what he didn’t believe. He reassured the public that there was no cause for alarm—nothing threatening or dramatic is about to occur in Cuba. In so doing, he gave the Soviets a chance to withdraw without making a public spectacle. (In private, he told Dobrynin that the United States views the Soviet base with the utmost gravity.)

As Kissinger hoped, the liberal press recognized his reputation for duplicity, and urged that Kissinger concealed a dire threat to American security. Critics such as Senators Church and Fulbright believed that Kissinger was up to his old tricks: He actually wanted American leaders and their constituents to believe ominous events were unfolding in Cuba. But, again as Kissinger hoped, the senators would not be taken in—or so they thought. They thought they saw through Kissinger: Surely the submarine base was a ruse contrived to extract more largesse for the Pentagon. The senators rejected the notion of another Cuban crisis; Kissinger was free to pursue successful diplomacy.

However, given Kissinger’s reputation for duplicity, other episodes were not success stories. Later, serving as secretary of state, Kissinger would lament his lack of success in resolving Asian conflicts to his satisfaction: “I’m the only secretary of state who has lost two countries [Vietnam and Cambodia] in three weeks.”

At the risk of offering a mere tautology, I suggest that the Cienfuegos episode simply wasn’t a Nixon-style crisis. What was? The answer is evident in his *Six Crises* and in the revelations of those involved in his presidency. The book reveals that Nixon was not preoccupied with managing foreign affair; he was obsessed with managing Nixon. As his confidant, H. R. Haldeman remarked: “History to him is what happened to Nixon—and what might happen later.”

*Six Crises* chronicles vintage crises, venal humiliations, that happened to Nixon. There is no temptation to extol his responses as profiles in courage. What’s left unsaid is revealing. The book, with the exception of the Alger Hiss case, recounts Nixon’s tenure as vice president of the United States. However, one searches in vain for recollections of
great decisions regarding episodes such as: the Korean war; the detonation of a Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1954; the defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954; the Soviet invasion of Hungary, 1956; the Soviet sputnik, 1957; or the advent of the Castro regime, 1959. In short, these and other world-historical events are not Nixon crises.

What then, were Nixon crises? Like the fictive Willy Loman, the real Richard Nixon endured crises when he felt cheated by life because—despite his willingness to play the game—he realized he was not “well-liked.” Worse yet, he suffered slights and humiliations. As Willy confessed to this wife, “You know, the trouble is, Linda, people don’t seem to take to me.” Nixon had similar apprehension: “It is true that of all the Presidents in this century, that I have less . . . supporters in the press than any other President. I’m one of the most hated.” His apprehension was not baseless. As Walter Cronkite reminded Nixon in an interview: “I know you must be aware . . . that there are some . . . who would say, “I don’t know what it is, but I just don’t like this man. I can’t put my finger on it; I just don’t like him.”

Being well-liked wasn’t an issue for the suave and charming Kennedy, a leader who, apparently, tried to model himself after of John Quincy Adams or Winston Churchill. Nixon’s crisis narratives and his deeds suggest that Willy Loman was the Nixon archetype. Nixon’s biographers could be portraying the low tragedy of the feckless salesman when they portray Nixon as a man shaped by misfortune and humiliation, an insecure individual who felt cheated by life. He suffered from an indelible recollection of slights, real and imagined. Getting even led to his hubris.

Arthur Miller could be describing Nixon when he writes of Willy Loman:

It is the tragedy of a man who did believe that he alone was not meeting the qualifications laid down . . . by those clean-shaven [new] frontiersmen. . . . He heard the thundering command to succeed as it ricochets down the newspaper-lined canyons of his city, heard not a human voice, but a wind of a voice to which no human can reply in kind, except to stare into the mirror of failure.

The dramatist recognized that the low tragedy of the hapless salesman could be writ large if Willy Loman became president:

There is no doubt that if a character is shown on stage who goes through the most ordinary actions, and is suddenly revealed to be the president of the United States, his actions
immediately assume a much greater magnitude, and pose the possibilities of much greater meaning than if he is the corner grocer.\textsuperscript{32}

The son of the grocer became president. As Nixon informed Khrushchev during the Kitchen Debate crisis, an episode narrated in \textit{Six Crises}: “You may be interested to know that my father owned a small [grocery] store . . . and all the Nixon boys worked there while going to school.\textsuperscript{33}

The Kitchen Debate crisis is vintage Nixon. His 1959, ceremonial trip to Moscow began with yet another slight: he wasn’t greeted properly at the airport—no bands, no anthems, no crowds. He and Khrushchev traded insults in an American model kitchen installed in the Kremlin. The crisis climaxed amid a clash about competition in home appliances: The bumptious Russian jabbed his finger into Nixon’s chest. Nixon boasts of his resolution of the crisis: \textit{He} poked Khrushchev. Photographs of Nixon’s retaliatory poke became iconic—at least for Nixon. With embarrassing candor, he attached world-historical significance to getting even with those who humiliated him.

Other crises were resolved in a like manner, a manner that beneath the dignity of a de Gaulle, Churchill, or Eisenhower. \textit{Six Crises} narrates the vice president’s unfortunate good will trip to South America. He wasn’t well-liked; his limousine was pelted with rotten eggs and fruit. The crisis was settled to Nixon’s satisfaction when a secret service agent grabbed a protestor and kicked him in the shins. Nixon assures the reader that: “Every move in the crisis-laden struggle was important. At stake was world peace and the survival of freedom.”\textsuperscript{34}

It is tempting to speculate about the Cienfuegos incident. (Oscar Wilde was right: The best way to deal with temptation is to give in.) Had Soviet Premier Brezhnev jabbed Nixon while the world watched, and threatened to deploy nuclear submarines in Cuba, the shelves would groan with accounts of the Cuban submarine crisis—if anyone survived the confrontation. \textit{Six Crises} reveal the thirty-seventh president as Everyman: insecure, venal, and envious of inherited success. Could it be that we had the good fortune of having Everyman in office in 1970 rather than a would-be, existential hero?


4 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979); see his account of the episode pp. 633-644. This was not the first time Nixon was preoccupied with vacationing rather than issues at hand. During a decisive time during the Alger Hiss investigation, Nixon chose to vacation rather than remain in Washington. See Tom Wicker’s discussion in his *One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream* (New York: Random House, 1992), 64.


8 Cultural anthropologists Victor Turner explicates “social dramas,” crises at other times and places. Such dramas are rites of passages, liminal experiences in which the initiate is caught “betwixt and between” narratives. Old narratives no longer resonate and the world is bereft of new narratives to guide his dark night of the soul. The initiate is called upon to improvise a new narrative, lest he perish. This phenomenological account of the crisis experience offers insight into those who constructed and managed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. See Turner’s *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).


16 Ibid.

17 Quoted by Starn, 8.

18 Kissinger, *White House Years*, 55.


21 Quoted by Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (New York: New Press, 1991), 114. Kennedy’s most trusted advisors shared this view, but the hawks—military officials and Dean Acheson—disagreed.


25 Kissinger recounts this convoluted saga of double-reverse psychology in *White House Years*, 648.


30 Quoted by Christopher Matthews in “Great Debate” in the *San Francisco Examiner Magazine*, April 28, 1996, 12.


