The Gaede Institute for the Liberal Arts was established in 2000 with the goal of strengthening liberal arts education locally and nationally. The Institute hosts scholarly conversation on the present and future of the liberal arts, provides liberal arts opportunities to area communities outside the academy, promotes educational access for first-generation and underserved populations, and fosters interdisciplinary contact between faculty and students through extracurricular events on campus.

 

 

Recent Programs

 

liberal arts poster

Reel Talk Screening: "Liberal Arts"

Hosted by Cheri Larsen Hoeckley

 

Thursday, April 16

7:00 p.m.

Adams Room 216


For many of us, college graduation means giving up seminars on romantic poetry for spreadsheets and staplers, moving from an environment of limitless intellectual exploration to the very bounded world of work. What happens to the life of the mind once we leave campus? Do the responsibilities of profession and family inevitably submerge the joy of learning? "Liberal Arts" depicts one unhappy young professional's attempt to recpature the excitement and idealism of his college experience. As he returns to his liberal-arts alma mater, he finds nostalgic comfort in some of the people and places he encounters there; but he also discovers that certain aspects of himself and his past are unrecoverable. Westmont English professor Cheri Larsen Hoeckley hosts this warm and appealing meditation on transition, memory, and identity. We hope you'll join us!

 

 

frowe"Is God the Soul of the World? Leibniz Against Three Forms of Pantheism"

Adam Harmer

Professor of Philosophy

University of California, Riverside

 

Philosophy Department Lecture

Friday, April 17, 2015, 3:30 p.m.

Winter Hall 216

 

Leibniz denies that God is the soul of the world. At first blush, his argument seems to rely on mathematical considerations, in particular on the rejection of infinite number. Professor Harmer argues that Leibniz’s rejection of the World Soul is actually the rejection of three distinct views, and that in no case does his argument rely on mathematical considerations. By identifying these distinct views and Leibniz’s distinct lines of argument against them, Harmer shows that Leibniz’s rejection of the World Soul should be seen as closely connected to central aspects of his metaphysics, including his theory of substance, his theory of perfection, and his claim that among the infinity of possible worlds, one can be designated as the best one.